The FBI arrested Jamshid Ghomi, a 63-year-old dual US-Iranian national, at his $35 million Newport Coast, California mansion on June 3. The charges: conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by funneling American-made networking, security, and encryption hardware to Iranian customers tied to the country’s military and nuclear programs.

Ghomi, the CEO of Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd. (FPR), allegedly ran this operation for over a decade without ever obtaining the required licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Federal prosecutors made clear they intend to throw the book at him.

“We will hold him accountable by seeking an appropriate prison sentence and by seizing his assets, including his $35 million Newport Beach mansion.”

What Ghomi allegedly did

The scheme was, at its core, a supply chain operation. Ghomi’s company, FPR, allegedly procured US-origin networking and encryption hardware, then shipped it to entities inside Iran. The end users reportedly included organizations connected to Iran’s military apparatus and its nuclear program.

The IEEPA, the law Ghomi is charged with conspiring to violate, is the federal government’s primary tool for enforcing economic sanctions. It grants the president broad authority to regulate commerce with foreign entities deemed threats to national security. Violating it is a federal crime with serious teeth: potential prison time measured in years, not months, plus the forfeiture of assets connected to the scheme.

In this case, that means Ghomi’s property at 31 High Water in Newport Coast, valued at $35 million.

The broader sanctions enforcement landscape

The US has maintained comprehensive sanctions against Iran for decades, targeting the country’s nuclear ambitions and its support for proxy forces across the Middle East. FPR’s alleged decade-plus run suggests the operation was either well-concealed or simply flew under the radar for a long time.

What this means for the tech and compliance world

If you’re a US-based technology vendor selling networking equipment, encryption hardware, or any dual-use technology, this case is a reminder that your compliance obligations don’t end at the point of sale. Know-your-customer requirements extend to understanding where your products ultimately end up. Even negligent failure to screen buyers against OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals list can result in massive fines and reputational damage.

There is no indication that Ghomi or FPR used cryptocurrency in any part of the alleged scheme. This appears to be an old-school operation: physical hardware, traditional financial channels, and a very expensive house. Searches across multiple platforms returned no evidence suggesting involvement in crypto transactions or related financial activities.

The Treasury Department’s OFAC has sanctioned multiple crypto wallet addresses and mixing services tied to North Korean and Iranian actors. But this case demonstrates that plenty of sanctions evasion still happens through entirely conventional means.

If prosecutors successfully seize Ghomi’s $35 million property, it will add to a growing portfolio of high-value asset seizures in sanctions cases. These forfeitures serve a dual purpose: they strip defendants of ill-gotten gains and they fund further enforcement operations.